UK -Politics & World Current Affairs

Last month a cartoon in the Daily Telegraph depicted ‘Mr Middle Britain’ raising a finger covered in purple dye – the visual image of Iraq’s budding democracy among Britons – saying to his wife ‘ I have just voted to abstain in the coming election.’
Matt the cartoonist has, brilliantly, captured the mode in two nations: With an over 62 per-cent turnout showing Iraqis’ appetite for shaping political events, while in Britain, (where most families whose loved ones made the perfect sacrifice died to put Iraqis’ feet on the road of liberty and democracy sighed in satisfaction at seeing a smiling purple fingered Iraqi woman on most front pages), electorate were becoming increasingly distrustful of a system abused by lawmakers elected to represent the very taxpayers they fleeced through exaggerated, and often unjustified expenses.

The BBC political-agenda-making programmes like Today or News Night which, for seven years, spearheaded the opposition to the war that toppled the Baath tyranny, and, cynically, didn’t miss an opportunity to selectively, present bad news casting doubt on the value of the whole exercise by wheeling out Arab Nationalist commentators lamenting the ‘ stability’ that the late Saddam Hussein secured; shocked their audience by failing to find significant negative incidents on election day to tarnish New Iraq’s democratic project. Veteran foreign editor John Simpson’s voice came live from Baghdad applauding the Iraqis’ bravery when turning out en-mass to cast their votes ignoring terrorists’ threats.
American forces stayed in their barracks outside cities on stand- by; but they were never called as the streets and polling centres were made safe, by Iraqi security forces acting professionally for the first time in half a century, without a Baathi commissar breathing down their necks.
With iceberg nerves they dealt with multiple terrorist bomb-blasts on the morning of the vote, adamant that the show should go on; a massive moral boosting for them.
Good news for President Barak Obama too who wanted to bring most of his boys home before this autumn, thanks Iraqi security forces, which were built in remarkably short time (given the fragmentation of Iraqi society among sectarian, religious and ethnic lines), following the American’s unprecedented folly of dismantling the Iraqi army (the only remaining functional institution) in the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s fall).
Arab media varied in their comments. Some warmly greeted Iraq as just about the only Arabic speaking nation who doesn’t have to wait for a military coup, or facts of biology to change their rulers, as one Egyptian satirist put it; others, especially those controlled by dictatorships, questioned the validity of the election ‘ under foreign occupation’.
Non-Arab commentators, almost, universally agreed that Iraqi electorate matured, much faster than expected for a tribal Arab Muslim nation who hadn’t seen a free election since 1958 when it was plagued by military coups ending up in 1979 with oe of the most brutal fascist regimes in history.
The last local elections, two years ago, Iraqis voted according to their economic needs and value-for-taxes services, avoiding seduction by the type ideological slogans that Gaza Palestinian came to regret after their last vote over four years ago.
In one of the ironies of mature democracy Iraqi political leaders emulated western politicians in exploiting economical and fiscal tools in their disposal to woo voters.
Despite his opponents’ best efforts, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used state-funded levers in January budget to his advantage by transferring large numbers of government temporary contractors to full-time positions, most of which were funded directly out of his own office.
Hadn’t he been blocked in Parliament, he would have managed to add a further 115,000 new workers to the public sector, translated into double the figure in votes for his predominantly Shia the State of Law (TSL) alliance. Just weeks before the election he promised to restore 20,000 former military officers to service.
Article 43 of his budget (royalty payments to oil- and gas-producing provinces) was seen as another vote-buying spending spree, which has mortgaged next years’ budget (as first payments fall). His electioneering was accused of use of largesse (distributing generators emblazoned with his logos) paid for by the Baghdad Amanat, (State run Baghdad’s inner-city Administration).
Such ploys were not the monopoly of Malki as other political leaders mobilised state-funded resources to support their campaign.
The powerful Shia coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), forced that hand of Accountability and Justice Committee (AJC) to remove over 500 candidates from the ballot (inspired by Iran’s Guardian Council which vets candidates).
The 200 lists system ( a proportional representation system that regarded Iraq in 2005, as a single district), gave voters little influence over which candidates prevailed. It has been criticised for deepening sectarian division by encouraging voters - especially in rural and tribal areas – to back their kin instead of soberly calculating benefits anticipated for their direct constituencies.
It was amended slightly this time ( an open-list system within each province), resulting in reducing political coalition leaders’ control over their constituent parties; yet it still far away from mature democracies of local constituencies where electorate is directly involved with his/her MP.
Still missing is finance regulation to block the kind of manipulation of state funds used by Malki, whose TSL list is said to have done very well, and restriction on foreign contributions.
Elements of the INA, like al-Hakim led Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Alsadrs ( Sadrist) movement, were accused of drawing funding from Iran. While in Northern Iraq, ruled by the Kurdish Regional Government, there is only a tenuous separation between state institutions and those of the two main political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK.
There is no constitutional precedent for the current state between the dissolution of the Malki government following March 7 elections and the ratification of a new executive branch this month [[ April]]. Nothing in the law would stop political parties using state organs woo potential coalition partners.
The horse-trading to form a working majority coalition is not only tricky but it can take weeks, if not months.
A coalition where Malki has strong influence would enable him to deploy more battalions in trouble areas speeding the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Also did well, is the more secular and wider cross-sectarian Iraqi National Movement (INM) lead by Malki’s predecessor Iyad Alawi ( much stronger than Malki and more seasoned in Iraqi politics as he was part of Saddam’s early government before fleeing to UK followed by Saddam’s sent assassins to his south London home in 1987 leaving him scarred for life). But the final results won’t be known before the middle of this month [April], when parliament will meet to start the thorny business of forming a government, after it first elects a speaker, who has to be a Sunni Arab, according to recent precedents. Then, as constitution indicates, electing a president, possibly a Kurd.
It is likely to be summer before MPs set down the ‘ path of 163’ ( number seats needed for a majority in the legislative chamber). Neither a precedent, nor the division of lists, would allow any party to come close to ‘ the path’ on its own. Fragmentation of Iraq’s political map would enable Malki whose list won 89 seats coming second after Mr Aallawi’s list won 91 seats ( out of 235 total), to be frontrunners to form a coalition. Iraqi politicians, have no choice but to accommodate each other just to get the wheels spinning. Despite the poor visibility, for whoever in the driving seat, there are conflicting options along the road to forming government.
A Malki/ Kurdish block is a strong possibility but still way short of the 163 . He might try to attract some groups from within the INA, which would require expensive sweeteners as he had fallen out with a few of them in the past. He will remain Prime Minister until a new government is formed which gives him a stronger hand to play; he might even attract some of Allawi’s INM secular partners.
Allawi’s choices are narrower as going to bed with the Kurds can cost him Sunni Arab allies ( mainly in what used to be Mosul Velayyat that didn’t join Iraq until five years after its foundation in 1922), who historically distrust Kurds and believe they have got a far bigger share than they deserve. While looking south to form alliance with some pragmatic Shia from INA could lose him the much needed support of his Arab allies in central Iraq and around the capital since they loath the pro-Iran southern Shia.
Although his non-sectarian approache was applauded by the intelligentsia and professionals, it might become his albatross when he approaches wider groups to form an alliance.
Groupings of smaller parties could hold the balance of power but they can also stagnate policy or hold the country to ransom as they often did in Israel’s coalition governments in the past 30 years, which leaves the Kurds in their familiar role as kingmaker according to Baghdad western diplomats. Others say Kurds seem weaker this time round. A newly group Goran ( Kurdish for ‘ change’) who opposes the old tribal hierarchy, have made some impressive gains in the elections which might split the Kurdish vote in parliament in certain issues undermining the old older which enabled Kurdihs vote, as a block, to call the shots.
While the INA in theory represents the majority of Iraqis and enjoys the backing of neighbouring Iran (and Syria by default), it has lesser chances of gaining grounds at the expense of Malaki or Allawi. Its more pragmatic wing The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq ISCI, has lost ground, among Shia, to the more extreme Sadris, making it difficult for INA to go into a coalition with Sunnis, secular groups or the Kurds. Another unlikely, but possible scenario if ISCI pragmatically joins Malki’s , then Al-sadr, supported by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, would create a Hizbulah style mini-state , but will keep their heads down for the time being until the Americans leave.
While Iran and America eye each-other’s allies and obviously each side tries to shore its friends, the Iranians can afford to bid their time.
The success of the Iraqis, not only welcomed by democratic forces who have lesser voice in other Arab countries but also by , the Iranians. Working on a long-term strategy they are unlikely to intervene to influence the business of forming a coalition at this stage.
The firebrand mullah Muqtda al-sadr, leader of most untamed of all militias, Al-Mahdi army ( who had the most serious stand off against the coalition troops in the summer of 2006) cast his vote from a safe distance in Iran, ordering his militia to avoid confrontation the Iraqi security forces.
It can’t be a mere caution by a man not known for his wise pragmatism, but rather the unseen hand of Ayatollah Khamenie shortening his leach.
A successfully stable democratic Iraq is in this interest in the short term, as this will speed up American’s pull-out while the Iranians will remain next door to an Iraq, where their coreligionist Shia, will always be a majority within any ruling collation regardless which colours fly on the government premises.
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© Copyrights Adel Darwish 2010, not be lifted, reprinted quoted in whole or part without permission.